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Abstract
This paper discusses the problem of invertibility between
the economic shocks in a dynamic equilibrium model and the
corresponding VAR innovations. We present an algebraic check
of invertibility based on the model fundamentals and we ﬁnd the
identiﬁcation scheme that recovers the economic shocks from
the VAR innovations when the model is invertible. We illustrate
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1our results with a model of the Great Depression proposed by
Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2005).
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1. Introduction
An equilibrium of a dynamic economic model maps the history of a vector




where wt represents the whole history of shocks wt up to period t.T h e
economic shocks aﬀect the fundamental elements of the theory: preferences,
technology, informational sets, government policy, measurement errors, etc.
The observables are all variables that the researcher has access to. The
mapping d(·) is the outcome of the equilibrium behavior of the agents in
the model, captured by their optimal decision rules and the consistency
conditions like resource constraints and market clearing. Via the mapping
d(·), an economic theory tightly relates shocks and observables.
Often, we are interested in dynamic models such that d(·) has a linear
form, yt = d(L)wt,w h e r eL is the lag operator. For simplicity of expo-
sition, wt will be an i.i.d. normal random variable, wt ∼ N (0,I), and yt
will have a zero mean. We call this representation of yt the MA represen-
tation with respect to the economic shocks. There are two ways to obtain
2equilibrium representations of this form. One is to compute a ﬁrst-order
approximation of a nonlinear model around the deterministic steady state.
A second possibility is to derive yt = d(L)wt as the representation of a class
of dynamic models with linear transition laws and quadratic preferences.
Since yt is a linear function of the history of wt, yt always “reﬂects” wt.
Does the history of observables “reveal” the history of economic shocks?
A way to answer to the query is to check the zeros of det(d(L)).I f t h e
zeros are outside the unit circle, we say that d(L) has an inverse that is
“one-sided” in the past and present values of yt, which implies that the
Hilbert space spanned by the history of yt, H(yt), equals the Hilbert Space
spanned by the history of wt, H(wt).1
There is alternative approach to answer our question. Consider the




being the VAR innovations. We can check whether the Hilbert
space spanned by the history of at, H(at),e q u a l sH(wt).S i n c eat is con-






, this approach and the one based on






,t h e r e
exists a procedure to make the impulse-response of the VAR to match
1H(xt) is the Hilbert space spanned by the completion of the square
summable linear combinations of current and past values of xt.






,i ti sn o t
possible to replicate d(L) with the impulses responses of a VAR.
To ﬁx ideas, consider a simple, unidimensional example. Assume that
our economic model implies the following d(L):
yt = wt +2 wt−1,w t ∼ iid N (0,1).









,a t ∼ iid N (0,1).
The impulse-response function implied by the economic model, (1,2,0,0,...),
is diﬀerent from the impulse-response function associated with the AR rep-
resentation, (2,1,0,0,...).
Why are the two impulse-response functions so diﬀerent? First, note












But, d(L) is not invertible. In fact, wt belongs to the Hilbert space spanned












In this simple example, invertibility is determined by whether the co-
eﬃcient in front of wt−1 is bigger or smaller than one in absolute value. In
general, however, dynamic models have more than one observable, more
than one economic shock, and more lags. These complications expand the
ways in that the observables may partially conceal the economic shocks.
At the same time, more observables mean more information and more pos-
sibilities to recover the economic shocks.
To analyze the multidimensional case, we consider two recursive rep-
resentations of the observables. One representation links observables to
economic shocks:
xt+1 = Axt + Bwt,
yt = Cxt + Dwt
where xt are the states of the model and A, B, C, and D are functions
of the deep structural parameters of our model. A second representation
5links observables to VAR innovations:
b xt+1 = Ab xt + Kat,
yt = Cb xt + at
where b xt = b E
¡
xt|yt−1¢
is the best linear predictor of xt and K is steady-
state Kalman ﬁlter gain.
Is it possible to recover the history of economic shocks wt from the
history of VAR innovations at? The answer depends on A, B, C, and D,i . e . ,
on the structural parameters and the cross-equation restrictions implied by





































































into the second equation,
2What does it mean D−1 exist? Basically, two things. First, that we

























Therefore, the question: “Is it possible to recover the history of eco-
nomic shocks wt from the history of VAR innovations at?” asks to check













are inside the unit circle.
The next theorem (whose proof, like the proof of theorem 2, can be
found in Fernández-Villaverde, Rubio-Ramírez, and Sargent, 2005) presents
a simple algebraic check for the value of those zeros for the “square” case
have the same number of shocks and observables. Second, that the contem-
poraneous eﬀects of any two economic shocks on observables are diﬀerent,
i.e., we do not have redundant economic shocks.
7that D−1 exists.













equal the eigenvalues of A − BD−1C and A.
Theorem 1 tells us that to check if the model is invertible, we only need
to compute the eigenvalues of A − BD−1C (since we only consider stable
systems, the eigenvalues of A are always less than one).
Now, let us assume that the model is invertible, i.e. the eigenvalues of
A−BD−1C are all less than one in absolute value. How do we recover wt
from at? Theorem 2 provides us with the answer.
Theorem 2. Suppose that D−1 exists and that A − BD−1C is a stable
matrix. Then in the steady state Kalman ﬁlter, K = BD−1 and Σ =
E (xt − b xt)(xt − b xt)




Theorem 2 says that for a particular subset of invertible models, those
with the eigenvalues of A−BD−1C are strictly less than one, we have that
Σ =0 , i.e., we can perfectly forecast the states of the model, and we can
calculate the Kalman gain immediately from K = BD−1.














Therefore, we need only to set G = D to ﬁnd wt using only contempo-
raneous at. The choice of G is unique only up to postmultiplication by
an orthogonal matrix. Also, with this identiﬁcation, the impulse-response
function of the VAR will match those of the economic model.
2. A Model of the Great Depression
To illustrate our results, we use an economy proposed by Christiano, Motto,
and Rostagno (2003) (CMR hereafter). CMR present a model of the U.S.
economy to analyze the role of monetary policy during the Great Depres-
sion. Because of space constraints, we only present a summary of the
economy and refer the reader to the original paper for details.
A representative, perfectly competitive, ﬁrm produces a ﬁnal good Yt






where 1 ≤ λf,t < ∞ is a stochastic process that controls the elasticity of
substitution among intermediate goods.
Intermediate goods are produced by competitive monopolists using cap-











where Φ is a ﬁxed cost, εt is a stationary technology shock, and zt = µzt−1
is the trend growth rate in technology. The intermediate good producers
ﬁx their prices Pjt subject to Calvo pricing frictions. In each period, a
fraction 1 − ξp of intermediate good producers reoptimize its price, while
the fraction ξp keeps the prices of the last period, indexed by past inﬂation,
πt−1. The rental price of capital is Prk
t and the wage Wt. The ﬁrm must
ﬁnance a fraction ψk of the capital payments and a fraction ψl of the labor
payments in advance through a working-capital loan with interest rate Rt.
Capital is produced by competitive ﬁrms that buy old capital xt at price
QK
0,t and investment goods It at price Pt to produce new capital xt+1, with
a technology xt+1 = xt + F (It,I t−1) that reﬂects the adjustment costs of
investment. Because the rate of transformation between xt+1 and xt is
1, the selling price of new capital is also QK
0,t. Aggregate capital evolves
according to Kt+1 =( 1− δ)Kt + F (It,I t−1), where δ is the depreciation
factor.
Capital services are provided by entrepreneurs. At the end of period
10t, an entrepreneur has a net worth Nt.W i t h Nt and a bank loan, the
entrepreneur buys an amount of capital Kt+1. After the purchase, the
capital becomes ωKt+1, where logω is an i.i.d. normal random variable
with zero mean and (stochastic) standard deviation σt. The value of ω is
known after the purchase of capital while the value σt is known before.
After observing the shock, the entrepreneur rents its capital at the level of






where a(ut+1)ωKt+1 is the convex cost of utilizing capital at rate ut+1.
After production, the entrepreneur sells undepreciated capital to capital
producers, pays oﬀ debt to banks, and receives a transfer We
t .T h e s et h r e e
elements determine its new net worth Nt+1. At the end of the period, a
fraction 1 − γt of entrepreneurs dies, their net worth distributed among
households, and a fraction 1 − γt of new entrepreneurs is born. Mortality
ensures that the credit market restrictions remain binding by bounding
(almost surely) the distribution of capital.
A representative, perfectly competitive bank engages in two activities.
First, it borrows an amount Bt from households at a nominal rate of return
Re
t+1 to lend it to the entrepreneurs at rate Zt+1. The parameters of the
entrepreneur’s loan are chosen to maximize its utility, subject to zero proﬁts
for the bank in each state of nature and to the requirement that Re
t+1 is
11uncontingent in time t +1shocks. If the borrower cannot pay because
of a low shock ω, he is declared bankrupt and all his wealth is seized by
the bank. For simplicity, CMR assume that there are no cost for the ﬁrst
activity. Second, the bank issues deposit liabilities Dh
t to households. Some
of these are kept as reserves while the rest are loaned as working-capital in
the form of deposits D
f






t, and excess reserves, Er
















where xb is a constant. Demand deposits pay an interest rate Rat. Finally,
even if there is a representative bank, we can deﬁne an interbank interest
rate Rb
t at which, otherwise identical banks would lend to each other.
There is a continuum of households indexed by i ∈ [0,1] which consume
Ct, allocate their wealth between currency Mt, demand deposits, and time






















is the utility from money and deposits, υt is a unit-mean liquidity shocks,
and θt is a stochastic parameter that controls preferences for deposits.
At the beginning of each period, households split their money, Mb
t , be-
tween currency and bank depositsAt, such that Mb
t = Mt + Ah
t+l. Since
the central bank credits bank deposits with Xt units of money, we have
Dh
t = At + Xt. As income, households get wages, the interest payments in
various form of loans, proﬁts from ﬁrms, and net worth of deceased entre-
preneurs. They use the resources for consumption, money accumulation,
saving, and to pay a lump sum to balance the government budget.
Since the household is a monopolistic supplier of its labor, it will op-
timally set its wage Wt given Calvo’s frictions, adjusting with probability
1−ξw. Otherwise, they index the wage by past inﬂation and technological
progress Wj,t = πt−1µWj,t−1. The diﬀerent types of labor are aggregated







where 1 ≤ λw < ∞. Finally, there is
government consumption Gt = ztg where g is a constant and a monetary
authority that sets Mb
t+1 = Mb
t (1 + xt).
13There are eight exogenous shocks in the model: the monopoly power
degree, λf,t; productivity of bank reserves, ξt; leisure shock, ζt; liquidity
shocks, υt; preferences for deposits, θt; productivity shock, εt; riskiness for
entrepreneurs, σt; and mortality rate, γt. The shocks (some in levels, some
transformed) follow an ARMA(1,1) process. The variable xt depends on
the eight exogenous shocks through a linear feedback rule.
An equilibrium of the economy can be deﬁned in a standard way and
approximated by linearization.
3. Results







PtYt logπt loglt Rb


















t are currency-to-demand deposit ratio and the bank reserves-
to-demand deposits ratio, V 1
t and V b
t are the velocity of M1 and the mon-
etary base and Pe
t ,t h ee x t e r n a lﬁnance premium, deﬁned as the diﬀerence
between the expected cost of borrowing for an entrepreneur and the pay-
ment of the bank to households for time deposits. CMR assume that these
13 variables are measured with some, linear, normal errors.
14The combination of 8 economic shocks and 13 measurement errors,
results in a model with 21 shocks. Our results of invertibility are interesting
for the case where we have a ‘square’ system. With too many shocks,
we know that the system is non-invertible, with too few, we suﬀer from
stochastic singularity.
To achieve a square system, we can proceed in three ways. One is to
increase the number of observables. Since we want to use CMR’s data set,
we do not follow this route. Second, we can eliminate 8 of the measurement
errors and keep 5 of them. This alternative seems arbitrary to us. There
is no compelling reason to think that some variables are observed with
measurement error and some are not. Finally, the third alternative is to
drop 5 of the observables and keep only 8 of them. This strategy seems
the most natural for our purposes.
But then, we face a second choice: which 8 variables to keep? One
approach is to compute all diﬀerent combinations of 8 variables out of 13
and study, for each and one of them, whether the resulting VAR is invertible
or not. For completeness, we undertook this exercise. However, because
of space considerations, we report only a summary of the results for two





























Note how the only diﬀerence between the two sets of variables is the sub-
stitution of the (log of) currency-to-demand deposit ratio, logdc
t, av a r i -
able recording a quantity, for the external ﬁnance premium, Pe
t ,av a r i a b l e
recording a price.
We take our structural parameter values from CMR’s estimates, which
are a combination of maximum likelihood and calibration. With those val-
ues, we run the code kindly lend to us by Larry Christiano to compute the
solution of the model and, with that solution, generate the corresponding
A,B,C,a n dD’s. The A and B will be the same for both sets of observables
while the C and D will diﬀer in one row.
What happens if we apply our simple check of invertibility to those
two sets of matrices? For X1
t ,w eﬁnd that the model is invertible: the
biggest eigenvalue is 0.976. However, for X2
t , the model is not invertible:
16the biggest eigenvalue is 1.030.
What are the consequences of this lack of invertibility? First, the re-
searcher cannot obtain the exact value of the states even with a time series
for observables of inﬁnite length, i.e., Σ is diﬀerent from zero. Second, the
variance-covariance matrix of the one-step ahead forecast from the VAR is
bigger than the one from the true model. The covariance matrix of the in-
novations at is Eata0
t = CΣC0+DD0, while the variance-covariance matrix
of one-step ahead errors from the true model is DD0. In the non-invertible
case, since Σ is diﬀerent from zero, we have the extra quadratic term CΣC0.
Third, the impulse response functions obtained from the model and from
t h eV A Ra r ed i ﬀerent.
We ﬁnish by emphasizing two points. First, Watson (1994) explains
how a researcher is most vulnerable to non-invertibility when her VAR ex-
cludes measures of important endogenous variables that depend on streams
of expected future values of other variables. This is the situation in our
example with the currency-to-demand deposit ratio: it oﬀers information
about quantities that help to reveal the true value of the states, something
that the external ﬁnance premium, a price, does not do. Second, this ex-
ample illustrates how diﬃcult it can be to guess the invertibility result ex
ante. It does not seem obvious or intuitive which of the two speciﬁcations
17of the VAR is invertible. Consequently, this example justiﬁes the poten-
tial importance of our theoretical results in section 2 as a device to help
researchers to check for invertibility.
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